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This Essay takes prior work on Chevron in a new direction, arguing
that broad deference doctrines have the largely unrecognized but
particularly pernicious effect of increasing the political gridlock and
politicization of the legislative process. Untethered from the need to
actively govern agencies that have been delegated sufficiently broad
authority to keep the basic ship of state afloat, legislators refocus their
attention on maintaining power for themselves and their political party.
In the thirty or so years since Chevron became the law of the land, our
country’s governing institutions have grown increasingly politicized: At
the risk of overstating this Essay’s claim, perhaps Chevron itself—and
the related embrace of broad judicial deference to the administrative
state of which it is part—is in some measure responsible for our current
sorry political state.
This is an undesirable outcome. And, as framed here, it is not only
unfortunate, but also problematic on separation of powers grounds.
The intuition explored in this Essay is that Chevron dramatically
exacerbates Congress’s worst tendencies, encouraging Congress to push
its constitutional legislative duties to the Executive. Chevron thus
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effectively allows, and indeed encourages, Congress to abdicate its role
as the most politically-accountable branch by deferring politically
difficult questions to agencies. This argument is, at core, based in
separation of powers concerns. While separation of powers concerns
generally focus on preventing one branch of government from
encroaching into the realm of the other branches, this Essay offers a
twist, arguing that Chevron’s demurral to agency interpretations
encourages a Congressional abdication of its constitutional
responsibilities—and that such deference is therefore an abdication of
the Judiciary’s constitutional role as a check on the problematic
conduct of its sister branches.
INTRODUCTION
When a federal agency1 misconstrues or misuses the authority dele-
gated to it by Congress, Congress can correct that agency’s action
through legislation. Courts may also be able to correct that agency’s
action. In some cases, courts may decide that the action clearly is not
permissible under the agency’s authorizing statute. In other cases,
courts may decide that the meaning of that statute is ambiguous and
the agency’s interpretation is sufficiently permissible, so they may al-
low the agency’s action. In either event, if Congress disagrees with the
court’s review of the agency’s action, Congress can correct the
agency’s action, and the court’s treatment of it, through legislation.
In the context of judicial review, we can situate this in the familiar
Chevron dynamic.2 At Step One, a court asks whether a statute is am-
biguous. If it is, then at Step Two the court asks whether the agency’s
construction of that statute is a permissible interpretation of it. Then,
at Step Three, Congress corrects the court’s or the agency’s interpreta-
tion of that statute through legislation.
Of course, there is no Chevron Step Three. But while Congress may
legislatively address any concerns that it has about how either agen-
cies or the courts interpret the legislation that it enacts, the argument
of this Essay is that Chevron—and, more generally, the principles of
judicial deference to agencies that the Chevron doctrine embodies—
actually makes such legislative action less likely than it would be in a
world without so deferential a doctrine. In other words, not only is
1. This Essay uses “agency” to refer to both executive and independent agencies, and some-
times also to the “Executive” as referring both to the President but also to agencies exercising
executive authority in carrying out legislative commands. The concerns expressed in this Essay
apply in similar kind to both independent and executive agencies.
2. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). This
Essay is intended for an audience familiar with the Chevron doctrine, so it foregoes with doctri-
nal background beyond what is relevant to the discussion.
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there formally no Step Three to the Chevron doctrine, but the Chev-
ron doctrine itself encourages Congress to give expansive deference to
agencies and makes it less likely that Congress will exercise its consti-
tutional control over the execution of the laws that it enacts.
That alone may be concerning on formalistic grounds. The idea that
judicial deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes ac-
tually induces ambiguous statutory drafting by Congress is a compel-
ling hypothesis on its own—one that has been studied at some length.3
Scholars considering this question, for instance, have considered how
the existence of deference affects the way Congress drafts statutes and
how deference to either institution (i.e., agencies or courts) affects the
incentives of individual legislators as a function of how close their pre-
ferred legislative outcomes are to those of the median legislator.4
And, of particular relevance to this Essay, scholars have also consid-
ered how the existence of deference doctrines affects the balance of
legislative efforts to police how agencies use their legislative authority
(e.g., through oversight hearings) versus relying on litigation outcomes
to signal problematic use of authority by agencies.5
This Essay takes this prior work in a new direction, arguing that
broad deference doctrines6 have an additional, particularly pernicious,
effect of increasing the politicization of the legislative process. Not
only do Chevron and related deference doctrines affect how legisla-
tors go about the business of Congress, but they change legislators’
understanding of what the business of Congress is. Untethered from
the need to actively govern agencies that have been delegated suffi-
ciently broad authority to keep the basic ship of state afloat, legisla-
tors myopically refocus their attention on maintaining power for
themselves and their political party. In this light, and at the risk of
overstating this Essay’s claim, in the thirty or so years since Chevron
became the law of the land, our country’s governing institutions have
grown increasingly politicized: Perhaps Chevron itself, and the related
embrace of broad judicial deference to the administrative state of
which it is part, is in some measure responsible for this sorry political
state.
3. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 550, 571 (2009).
4. Id. at 566–71.
5. Id. at 570; see also Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
6. This Essay is framed in terms of Chevron, but the discussion reflects upon “deference doc-
trines” more generally. The term “deference doctrines” is used throughout, with specific refer-
ence to Chevron as such a doctrine, but reflecting broader concerns about overbroad judicial
deference to agency decisions. The final portion of this Essay expands the discussion to situate
these concerns more generally. See sources cited infra note 58. R
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This is an undesirable outcome. And, as framed here, it is not only
unfortunate but also problematic on separation of powers grounds.7
Conversely stated, if this Essay’s argument holds some truth, separa-
tion of powers principles may offer some remedy to combat the harms
that Chevron has caused to our constitutional republic.
The intuition explored in this Essay is that Chevron dramatically
exacerbates Congress’s worst tendencies, encouraging Congress to
push its legislative functions to the Executive and to do so in a way
that increases the politicization and polarization of American law and
policy. This gives rise to a fear that Chevron effectively allows, and
indeed encourages, Congress to abdicate its role as the most politi-
cally-accountable branch by deferring politically-difficult questions to
agencies in ambiguous terms. This argument is, at core, based in sepa-
ration of powers concerns. While separation of powers concerns gen-
erally focus on preventing one branch of government from
encroaching into the realm of the other branches, this Essay offers a
twist, arguing that Chevron’s demurral to agency interpretations en-
courages a Congressional abdication of its constitutional responsibili-
ties—and that such deference is therefore an abdication of the
Judiciary’s constitutional role as a check on the problematic conduct
of its sister branches.
This discussion is situated in the context of several contemporary
debates. The ongoing vitality of the Chevron doctrine has been in
question for several years in the academic literature,8 and more re-
cently by a growing chorus on the Supreme Court.9 The legitimacy of
7. This Essay is of a feather with concerns expressed by others about the deterioration of the
separation of powers and the effects of that deterioration on the relationship between the Legis-
lative and Executive branches. See, e.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, Separation of Powers During the
Forty-Fourth Presidency and Beyond, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1454, 1455 (2009) (“Many of those bro-
ken structures and systems [in Washington, D.C.] implicate the separation of powers—and par-
ticularly, the interaction of the legislative and executive branches in performing their respective
and sometimes overlapping functions under the Constitution.”).
8. See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2016) [hereinafter
Hamburger, Chevron Bias]; Michael Herz, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1867 (2015); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND.
L. REV. 937 (2018). See generally Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron at 30: Look-
ing Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORD. L. REV 475 (2014). Discussions about Chevron fit
more generally into, and are a specific locus of concern within, ongoing discussions about the
legitimacy of the administrative state. As noted by Bill Funk, “More recently, however, there has
been a concerted effort arising in the academy, Congress, and the courts to undermine agency
regulation as fundamentally illegitimate—if not unconstitutional.” William Funk, The Attack on
Administrative Regulation, 42 VT. L. REV. 427, 427–28 (2018).
9. See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring); SAS
Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018); see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting “serious questions about the constitutionality of our
broader practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal statutes” under Chevron); Gu-
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the administrative state has been a central debate since we have had
an administrative state—and again has been of particular interest in
recent years.10 The politicization of the Judiciary, again of longstand-
ing importance, has crescendoed with recent nominations of Supreme
Court Justices.11 And, more narrowly, especially following the nomi-
nation of Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court, questions about
the Major Questions Doctrine—an exception or limitation to the
usual application of Chevron that has only occasionally, but with
increased frequency in recent years, been invoked by the Court12—
tierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154, 1158 (10th Cir. 2016) (in which then-Judge Gor-
such wrote a concurrence to his own majority opinion, writing that “Not only is Chevron’s
purpose seemingly at odds with the separation of legislative and executive functions, its effect
appears to be as well . . . . We managed to live with the administrative state before Chevron. We
could do it again.”); Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, & Christopher J. Walker, Judge Kava-
naugh, Chevron Deference, and the Supreme Court, REGULATORY REV. (Sept. 3, 2018), https://
www.theregreview.org/2018/09/03/barnett-boyd-walker-kavanaugh-chevron-deference-supreme-
court/.
10. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2015) [herein-
after HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?].
11. Elliott Ash & Daniel L. Chen, Kavanaugh Is Radically Conservative. Here’s the Data to
Prove It., WASH. POST (July 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/
2018/07/10/kavanaugh-is-radically-conservative-heres-the-data-to-prove-it/; Robert Barnes & Ed
O’Keefe, Supreme Court Nominee Gorsuch Stresses His Independence from President Trump,
WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/supreme-court-nomi
nee-gorsuch-starts-day-two-of-confirmation-hearings/2017/03/20/ccd81b02-0dbf-11e7-9d5a-a83e6
27dc120_story.html; Clare Foran & Joan Biskupic, Where Brett Kavanaugh Stands on Key Issues,
CNN (Oct. 6, 2018, 4:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/09/politics/kavanaugh-on-the-issues/
index.html; Matthew Goldstein, Brett Kavanaugh Likely to Bring Pro-Business Views to Su-
preme Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/10/business/kava
naugh-supreme-court-business-regulation.html; Carl Hulse, Gorsuch, Like Previous Supreme
Court Nominees, Keeps Views Hidden, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/02/20/us/politics/gorsuch-like-previous-supreme-court-nominees-keeps-views-hidden.html;
Ariane de Vogue, Neil Gorsuch on the Issues, CNN (Mar. 20, 2017, 7:11 AM), https://www.cnn
.com/2017/03/20/politics/neil-gorsuch-abortion-religious-liberty-environment-gun-control/index
.html.
12. The “Major Questions Doctrine” (which Justice Kavanaugh has referred to as the Major
Rules Doctrine) is a limitation on the Chevron doctrine that courts sometimes apply to limit the
discretion of agencies to interpret statutes in ways that implicate “question[s] of deep ‘economic
and political significance.’” See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (quoting FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)). The Chevron doctrine is premised in part
on an assumption that Congress intentionally leaves ambiguities in statutes, such that ambiguity
constitutes an implied delegation to agencies to resolve that ambiguity. The Major Questions
Doctrine is similarly premised on an assumption that Congress would not silently delegate such
authority to agencies over questions of “deep economic and political significance,” such that
Chevron deference should not extend to such matters. The Supreme Court has only occasionally
invoked this concept—although in recent years, the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit, with
then-Judge Kavanaugh, have turned to it with increased frequency. See generally Major Question
Objections, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2191 (2016); Michael Sebring, The Major Rules Doctrine: How
Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s Novel Doctrine Can Bridge the Gap Between the Chevron and
Nondelegation Doctrines, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBR. 189 (2018).
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are receiving more attention.13
This Essay is prompted, in particular, by a recent exchange between
Chris Walker14 and Philip Hamburger15 about Walker’s ongoing em-
pirical work on the Chevron doctrine.16 In the interest of being pro-
vocative, I frame the discussion below by saying that both Walker and
Hamburger are wrong—or, more accurately, both are quite correct in
their respective critiques but neither critique confronts the central
questions of how Chevron affects the politicization of decision-mak-
ing. In particular, I argue that Walker is wrong about Chevron de-
creasing politicization (it actually increases it, vice his empirics); and I
argue Hamburger is wrong about judicial independence being, on its
own, a virtue that demands preservation. Rather, I argue, Chevron
increases overall politicization across the government; and judicial in-
dependence can and should play an important role in checking legisla-
tive abdication of Congress’s role as a politically-accountable branch
in a way that would moderate that overall politicization.
One, and possibly the best, way to remedy this situation is to reest-
ablish the role of judge as independent decision maker, as Hamburger
argues. But, contra Hamburger, the virtue of judicial independence is
not endogenous to the Judiciary. Rather, judicial independence has an
instrumental virtue, at least in the context of Chevron. Where Con-
gress has problematically abdicated its role as a politically-accounta-
13. See generally Daniel Deacon, Judge Kavanaugh and “Weaponized Administrative Law”,
YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (July 11, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/judge-kavanaugh-
and-weaponized-administrative-law-by-daniel-deacon/; Tejas N. Narechania (@tnarecha), TWIT-
TER (July 11, 2018, 3:49 PM), https://twitter.com/tnarecha/status/1017179030645161984; Jeffrey
Pojanowski, Cabining the Chevron Doctrine the Kavanaugh Way, L. & LIBERTY (June 12, 2017),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2017/06/12/cabining-the-chevron-doctrine-the-kavanaugh-way/.
14. Christopher J. Walker, The Federalist Society’s Chevron Deference Dilemma, L. & LIB-
ERTY (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.lawliberty.org/2018/04/03/the-federalist-societys-chevron-defer
ence-dilemma/ [hereinafter Walker, Deference Dilemma].
15. Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, Illustrated by Statistics, L. & LIBERTY (Apr. 12, 2018),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2018/04/12/chevron-deference-administrative-state-philip-hamburg
er/ [Hamburger, Chevron Bias, Illustrated by Statistics].
16. Walker, along with co-authors Kent Barnett and Christina Boyd, has done some of the
most important and interesting work on Chevron in recent years, empirically studying how the
Chevron doctrine has affected judicial behavior as well as that of agencies (and, I would argue,
through them the Executive). For a discussion of the effect of Chevron on judicial behavior, see
Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1
(2017); Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, & Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law’s Po-
litical Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463 (2018). For a discussion of the effect of Chevron on
agency behavior, see Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L.
REV. 999 (2015). But the even more important question, in my mind and which Walker has only
briefly touched on, is how it affects the behavior of Congress. See generally Christopher J.
Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377 (2017) (discussing how the role
agencies play in the legislative process implicitly transfers Congress’s legislative functions to the
Executive).
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ble decision maker by deferring important political decisions to the
Executive, judicial refusal to defer to executive and agency interpreta-
tions of ambiguous statutes can force Congress to remedy problematic
ambiguities. This, in turn, can return the responsibility for making po-
litically-important decisions to the most politically-accountable
branch, as envisioned by the Constitution’s framers.17
This Essay proceeds in four Parts: a brief overview of the Chevron
debate, framed in terms of the dialogue between Walker and
Hamburger; a brief critique of Walker’s assertion that Chevron has
reduced the politicization of the Judiciary, arguing that politicization
of the Judiciary is not a particularly useful metric of politicization; a
discussion of how comparative institutional designs of judicial review
and legislative process affect the politicization of that process; and,
finally, a discussion of how different approaches to judicial deference
affect the politicization of the legislative process within any given leg-
islative institutional design.
I. CHEVRON & POLITICIZATION: THE DEBATE
Chevron is one of the defining doctrines of administrative law, both
as a central concept and focal debate. It stands generally for the pro-
position that when Congress gives agencies ambiguous statutory in-
structions, it falls to the agencies, not the courts, to resolve those
ambiguities. Thus, if a statute is ambiguous (the question at Step One
of the standard Chevron analysis) and the agency offers a reasonable
interpretation of that ambiguity (Step Two), courts are to defer to the
agency’s interpretation of the statute instead of supplying their own.
This judicially-crafted doctrine of deference is typically justified on
several grounds. For instance, agencies generally have greater subject-
matter expertise than courts, so they are more likely to offer substan-
tively better constructions of ambiguous statutes. Agencies have more
resources that they can dedicate to evaluating alternative construc-
tions. They generally have a longer history of implementing relevant
Congressional instructions, so they are more likely attuned to Con-
gressional intent—both of the statute’s enacting and present Con-
gresses. And they are subject to more direct Congressional oversight
in their day-to-day operations and exercise of statutory authority than
17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (Alexander Hamilton); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alex-
ander Hamilton) (“[A] voluminous code of laws is one of the inconveniences necessarily con-
nected with the advantages of a free government. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts,
it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to
define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them . . . .”).
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the courts, so they are more likely concerned with and responsive to
Congressional direction.
Chief among the justifications for Chevron deference is, as Walker
says, “the need to reserve political (or policy) judgments for the more
politically accountable agencies . . . .”18 This is at core a separation-of-
powers justification: The legislative process is fundamentally a politi-
cal process, so the Constitution assigns responsibility for it to the most
politically-accountable branch (the Legislature) instead of the least
politically-accountable branch (the Judiciary). In turn, the act of inter-
preting statutory ambiguity is an inherently legislative process—the
underlying theory being that Congress intended to leave such ambigu-
ity in the statute in order to empower the agency to interpret it in a
quasi-legislative manner. Thus, under this view, courts should defer to
this Congressional intent that the agency be empowered to interpret
its statute (and, should this prove problematic, it is up to Congress to
change the statute or to face political ramifications). Courts should
also defer to the agency interpretation of that statute because agen-
cies, like Congress, are more politically accountable than the courts.
Chevron has always been an intensively studied and debated doc-
trine. This debate has grown more heated in recent years, to the point
that there is ongoing scholarly discussion about whether Chevron
should be repealed or narrowed and what would replace it if it were
somehow curtailed.19 And discussion of the ongoing vitality of Chev-
ron has entered into Supreme Court opinions and the appointments
process with increasing frequency.20 These debates generally focus on
a few issues. A first issue is that Chevron amounts to a transfer of the
Legislature’s constitutional powers and responsibilities over creating
the law to the Executive, where the law ordinarily is only meant to be
carried out. This has, the underlying concern is, contributed to the
increase in the power of the Executive compared to that of the Legis-
lature. A second, related issue is that Chevron contributes to the
(over)empowerment of independent agencies. These agencies are al-
ready out of favor with many of Chevron’s critics as constitutionally-
infirm entities whose already-specious power is dramatically increased
when Chevron limits the Judiciary’s ability to check their use of al-
ready-broad Congressionally-delegated authority.
18. Walker, Deference Dilemma, supra note 14; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part
of either political branch of the Government.”).
19. See sources cited supra note 8. R
20. See sources cited supra note 9. R
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A third concern about Chevron, following on these first two, is that
it strips the Judiciary of its role as independent arbiter of judicial ques-
tions. That is, it has historically been the purview of judges to answer
statutory ambiguities and fill in legislative interstices.
Chevron is also a focal point for more generalized concerns about
the power of the modern administrative state. In this context, Chevron
stands as a representative of a broader class of cases—State Farm,21
Auer and Seminole Rock,22 City of Arlington,23 Brand-X,24 Fox v.
FCC,25 and the like—all of which are, at core, about the extent to
which courts should defer to agencies and all of which have tended to
support incrementally more deference. Thus Chevron allows Congress
to abdicate its role as politically-accountable legislator, abdicates the
Judiciary’s role in interpreting the law, and raises due process con-
cerns for those subject to rules promulgated by federal agencies.
Walker and his co-authors have empirically explored the effects of
Chevron in recent years, using robust surveys of federal agencies and
judicial decisions to understand how the doctrine has affected the
work of agencies and the courts. His most recent work (with Kent
Barnett and Christina Boyd) has explored how Chevron affects judi-
cial decision-making.26 Framing the question by explaining that “a
chief and express objective of Chevron deference is to remove politics
from judicial decisionmaking,”27 they ask whether “Chevron defer-
ence achieve[s] this goal of removing politics from judicial decision-
making?”28 They find that, empirically speaking, “the Chevron
Court’s objective to reduce partisanship in judicial decisionmaking has
been quite effective.”29 By instructing judges to defer to the political
judgments (or just statutory interpretations) of agencies, judges are
less political in their own decision-making.
21. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983) (defining the modern approach to arbitrary and capriciousness review).
22. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (extending Chevron deference to agency interpreta-
tions of their own regulations); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945) (the
precursor to Auer).
23. City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290 (2013) (extending Chevron and deference to
agency interpretations of their own jurisdiction).
24. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (allowing
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes to supersede judicial interpretation of the same
statute).
25. F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (holding that an agency’s prior
interpretation of a statute does not preclude, or impose a heighted burden on, the agency subse-
quently adopting a contradictory interpretation of the same statute).
26. Barnett, Boyd, & Walker, supra note 16.
27. Id. at 1466.
28. Walker, Deference Dilemma, supra note 14.
29. Barnett, Boyd, & Walker, supra note 16, at 1524.
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Hamburger responds to this finding somewhat dismissively: “of
course, judges disagree less when the Supreme Court bars them from
exercising their independent judgment about what the law is.”30 While
a fair critique—indeed, the finding is almost tautological—I would
temper it by arguing that it is nonetheless an important empirical find-
ing. Empirics that confirm important theory are as important as em-
pirics that refute it and are too often dismissed.
Rather than focus on concerns about politicized decision-making by
judges, Hamburger focuses instead on the importance of judicial inde-
pendence—on it being “emphatically the duty of the Judicial Depart-
ment to say what the law is.”31 He reframes Walker’s results, arguing
that “deference” to agencies is really “bias” in favor of the Execu-
tive.32 He argues that “Rather than reveal diminished politicization,
Walker’s numbers provide strong evidence of diminished judicial in-
dependence and even of institutionalized judicial bias.”33
So, which is it? Does Chevron reduce bias by de-politicizing judicial
decision-making? Or, does it introduce new bias in favor of the (inher-
ently political) Executive? The answer is probably that it does both.
The more important answer, however, is that neither is the right ques-
tion to ask.
II. THE MEASURE OF POLITICIZATION
Walker frames his study of the effects of Chevron on judicial deci-
sion-making by explaining that “Chevron deference strives to remove
politics from judicial decision-making. Such deference to the political
branches has long been a bedrock principle for at least some judicial
conservatives.”34 Based on this understanding, his project is to ask
whether “Chevron deference achieve[s] this goal of removing politics
from judicial decisionmaking?”35
This framing, that one of Chevron’s goals is to remove politics from
judicial decision-making, is not wrong: One of the Court’s justifica-
tions for the doctrine offered in Chevron itself was that “Judges are
not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of
the Government.”36 And this reflects the common sentiment that the
30. See Hamburger, Chevron Bias, Illustrated by Statistics, supra note 15.
31. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically




34. Walker, Deference Dilemma, supra note 14.
35. Id.
36. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-3\DPL302.txt unknown Seq: 11 29-MAY-19 16:56
2019] CHEVRON’S POLITICAL DOMAIN 625
Judiciary is separate from the political process and should defer back
to the political branches on political questions. But we can think of
this goal in another way: It can also be understood as being about
preventing the Judiciary from encroaching upon the political purposes
assigned to the Executive and Legislative Branches. This reframing is
subtle but offers an important change in focus. Instead of being about
keeping politics out of judicial decision-making, it emphasizes
preventing judicial decision-making out of politics. It emphasizes the
concern about politicizing judicial decision-making as a separation of
powers issue—and, in particular, it frames Chevron as being, at least
in part, about the “duty of the Court to resist the ‘hydraulic pressures
inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer lim-
its of its power.’”37
Under the more common understanding, judges should defer politi-
cal questions back to the political branches in order to ensure that
political decision makers are accountable to the polity they represent.
It is of course true that, as unelected officials with lifetime appoint-
ments, judges are the least politically accountable of any government
officials. Judges’ decisions, therefore, can reasonably be expected to
be less representative of, or responsive to, the concerns of the voting
public than decisions of other government officials. But not all politi-
cal decisions need to be directly politically accountable in order to be
effectively politically accountable. A judicial interpretation of an am-
biguous law, for instance, can be interpreted as a request, or even a
demand, that Congress be held to political account. And where Con-
gress is failing to perform its constitutionally-defined role as a politi-
cally-accountable decision maker, it may do less harm to the
separation of powers for the Judiciary to make political decisions that
force politically-accountable responses by Congress than for the Judi-
ciary to respect its constitutional role while Congress ignores its role.
Before going too far down this road, I should pause to label the
reframing of the debate that I have impliedly proposed. To my mind,
the important question is not whether Chevron reduces political deci-
sion-making by judges; the question is how Chevron affects the
politicization of, and ultimately accountability to the people for, the
law. Critically, there is no “conservation of politicization” principle.38
37. Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers: Interpretation Outside the Courts, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 57,
59 (1990) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
38. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu, Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commit-
ment, and Politics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 620 (2003); Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort,
Transaction Costs, Institutional Design and the Separation of Powers, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 673
(1998).
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Institutional design matters.39 One could imagine a model of govern-
ment where Congress exercises very direct oversight over what the
law is and how it is implemented, with frequent elections and a consti-
tutional prohibition on all but the most express and limited forms of
delegation. One can also imagine a more complicated form of govern-
ment in which responsibilities for making law, executing law, and in-
terpreting law are spread across multiple branches (possibly including
myriad agencies governed by rules that even many members of those
agencies do not understand). And one can reasonably expect greater
politicization of decisions in the latter compared to the former be-
cause there are more opportunities for saying that the responsibility
for any decision lies with someone else (and therefore for politiciza-
tion) in the latter than in the “the buck stops here” model of the
former.40
In the common law tradition, judges exercised an important degree
of independence because their job was, necessarily and largely, to “say
what the law is.” For better or worse, we no longer live in a world
where judges are expected to routinely exercise that level of discretion
and to therefore have that level of independence. Nor do I believe
that “independence” is necessarily or inherently a criterion for the Ju-
diciary, at least in principle. I therefore somewhat disagree with
Hamburger’s assertion that Chevron necessarily amounts to a prob-
lematic diminution in judicial independence.
On a consequentialist understanding of the purposes of judicial in-
dependence, we should consider the need for it in terms of whether
“independent” judicial decision-making tends to lead to better or
worse social outcomes. And here I do find myself sympathetic to
Hamburger’s concerns about judicial independence. The Judiciary is
intended to serve as a check on the other branches. Hamburger’s con-
cern about judicial independence is driven by an overwhelmingly cor-
rect intuition that the structure envisioned by the Constitution is one
in which the independence of judges is an important check on the
other branches. With respect to the Congress, this means, in part, en-
suring that Congress is held to political account when it does legisla-
tive tasks poorly or fails to do them at all.
The courts abdicate this role when they allow agencies to save
poorly-drafted statutes through an interpretation of ambiguity.
39. See generally Acemoglu, supra note 38; Laffont & Martimort, supra note 38.
40. See infra notes 49–51.
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III. THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF POLITICIZATION
Hamburger tells us that “Judges (and academics) need to wrestle
with the realities of how Chevron bias and other administrative power
is rapidly delegitimizing our government and creating a profound
alienation.”41 Huzzah! Amen!
Hamburger’s approach to these issues is, in very broad descriptive
contour, structural and constitutional. He focuses in part on under-
standings of legislative delegations of power to executive and adminis-
trative agencies in English law and on how concern about such
delegations affected the framers’ structuring of American government
in the Constitution.42 In effect, he argues that the framers understood
the British administrative state as a tool of and as contributing to the
tyranny of King George, and the framers placed the legislative power
squarely within the ambit of the other branches of government pre-
cisely to avoid the tendencies of executive and administrative states
towards tyranny.43 Translating these concerns to the modern setting,
he speaks of Chevron as a bias (“Chevron bias”) adopted by the Judi-
ciary in favor of government positions in litigation, and he argues that
such a bias in favor of the government (and therefore against citizen-
plaintiffs) violates basic understandings of due process.44 This is prob-
lematic on its own, and it is further problematic as an abdication of
Article III judges’ constitutional positions as independent decision
makers.
The formal (and formalist) response to Hamburger’s critique is that
legislatures necessarily must delegate some legislative authority to the
Executive and her officers (and therefore agencies), including discre-
tion in how to interpret and apply that authority. The existence of an
administrative state is therefore not only not an anomaly but a neces-
sity.45 Under this model, so long as the authority exercised by that
state derives in the first instance from the Legislature—and so long as
there is recourse for the courts to ensure that that authority does not
violate constitutionally-protected rights (no matter how fictional such
recourse may be46)—the administrative state fits within the constitu-
41. See Hamburger, Chevron Bias, Illustrated by Statistics, supra note 15.
42. See generally Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547 (2015) (reviewing HAMBURGER,
IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 10).
43. Id.
44. See generally Hamburger, Chevron Bias, supra note 8.
45. See generally Vermeule, supra note 42.
46. Justin Gus Hurwitz, Meet the Hero Who Fought the Administrative State and Won, HILL
(June 12, 2018, 6:30 PM) (discussing the efforts of the owner of a small medical testing lab who
successfully challenged an FTC enforcement action and how those efforts took nearly a decade
and put the lab out of business).
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tional design.47 Indeed, under this model, because the Legislature has
deliberately delegated authority to the Executive, judicial interference
in how the Executive exercises that authority would be an unconstitu-
tional encroachment by the Judiciary upon both the Legislative and
Executive Branches. In this understanding, Chevron is not a bias in
favor of the government, but respect for and refusal to encroach upon
the other branches.
My own normative priors leave me generally inclined towards
Hamburger’s history and his analysis, but as a matter of formal logic,
the response is equally compelling. My own approach to these issues,
however—which gets us to the same place as Hamburger’s—is conse-
quentialist and focuses on the merits of competing institutional de-
signs. The basic critique of the formalist response is that it assumes
that legislative and judicial review processes have zero transaction
costs (or, at least, transaction costs that are exceptionally low). This
leads to two undesirable pathologies of the administrative state. First,
it leads to an accumulation of power in the Executive Branch—this is
one of the chief concerns taken up by critics of the administrative
state, including Hamburger.48 Second, and what is actually a more
pernicious pathology, it leads to an abdication of responsibility by the
legislative branch because jockeying for control of the Executive be-
comes a less transaction-costly way of shaping policy than the legisla-
tive process itself. Indeed, the formalist institutional design
encourages an increased politicization of the legislative process.
This pathology is captured by what I call Chevron Step Three. At
Step Three of the Chevron analysis, Congress corrects any mistakes
made by the Executive or its agencies in implementation of the law or
made by the courts in their review of that implementation. The subtle
thing about Step Three is that it doesn’t exist—Congress is under no
obligation to correct problematic interpretations of the laws that it
passes, and knowing this, Congress rarely bothers with the politically
costly and practically difficult process of clarifying legislation. The first
implication of this result, that Congress is less likely to correct agen-
cies’ problematic use of delegated authority when that use is backed
by deference regimes, is well studied.49 But there is a deeper question
that comes from Congressional inattention to agency statutory inter-
pretation: What are legislators, freed from the cumbersome task of
managing the course of the administrative state, doing with their
time?
47. Vermeule, supra note 42, at 1558.
48. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 10.
49. See Bressman, supra note 3, at 570; McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 165–66.
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Due to the illusory nature of Step Three, Chevron encourages the
Legislature expressly not to legislate. The more expedient approach
for a legislator who disagrees with a Chevron-backed agency action is
to campaign on the disagreement—that is, to politicize it.50 If the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) interprets the Clean Air Act
too broadly, a legislator argues that we need to retake the White
House to get a new administrator in the agency so they can straighten
out the EPA’s interpretation of the law. If the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) interprets the Communications Act too nar-
rowly, a legislator argues that we need to retake the White House to
change the chair so that we can straighten out that mess. And legisla-
tors on the other side of these issues argue that we need to keep the
White House so that we can protect these right-thinking agency inter-
pretations from reversal by the loons on the other side that want to
throw out all of our accomplishments. The campaign slogans write
themselves.
So long as laws are written broadly, implementation of those laws
turns on the Executive, not on Congress; therefore, political attention
is focused on the Executive.51 Taking a further step back, so long as
Congress can write laws broadly, it has the incentive to do so. Such
laws are a political “double-whammy” for legislators. In passing the
law, legislators on both sides of an issue can claim a political victory in
having solved a problem—few will point out the minutiae that the law
has only delegated the problem to an agency to be fixed. And subse-
quently, however the agency implements the law, legislators will be
able to either claim (and campaign on) the agency’s success or decry
(and campaign on) its failure.52
So long as most agencies’ governing statutes are broad enough that
those agencies can keep the ship of state afloat, even if drifting rud-
derless, legislators have little incentive to turn inward to engage in the
business of government with their legislative peers. Rather, they are
freed to turn outward towards their next campaign, vilifying or deify-
ing the administrative decisions of the current government as best
suits their electoral prospects.
IV. POLITICIZATION AND THE DEFERENCE DOMAIN
The discussion above is built upon two important premises that bear
consideration. The first is a belief in democratic accountability and the
50. See Bressman, supra note 3, at 571–72.
51. Id. at 569.
52. Id. at 571–72.
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idea that uncertain policy decisions should ultimately be resolved by
the will of the people. Policy decisions, therefore, should generally be
made by politically accountable actors within the government. Indeed,
the greater a policy decision’s political valence, the greater the need
for that decision to be made by politically accountable actors.
In principle, in a world with zero transaction costs, the institutional
design of government would not matter.53 If an agency misinterpreted
Congressional instructions, Congress would act as a seamless check on
that misinterpretation; and the same for judicial misinterpretation.
And voters would seamlessly elect—or impeach—their legislators to
ensure that Congress was faithful to their will. In such a world, the
choice of deference rules would not matter because all decisions
would ultimately be resolved without cost through the political
process.
But in a world of positive—and relatively high—transaction costs,
the key question becomes what governmental design yields policies
closest to those desired by the polity.54 As described above, in a trans-
action-costly system, individual legislators have incentives to transfer
politically difficult decisions to the Executive. This shields them from
political accountability, allowing them to take credit for having done
something and to campaign on the Executive’s use of that authority
(no matter how the Executive uses it). Deference rules can either en-
courage or check this behavior. Broad deference rules, such as we
have today, encourage broad delegations of ambiguous authority to
the Executive and focus voter attention on how the Executive uses
that authority.55 This exacerbates the impact of the system’s transac-
tion costs. Alternatively, less deferential rules act as a check on any
Congressional abdication of legislative responsibility, insisting that the
more politically accountable branch be primarily responsible for polit-
ically valent decisions.
Importantly, this analysis suggests that judicial deference to an
agency interpretation of law should be inversely proportional to that
law’s political valence. Agency actions that go to matters of deep eco-
nomic or political significance, for instance, ought to receive propor-
tionally less deference.56 Congress simultaneously has great incentives
to “pass the buck” on these questions but also the most political ac-
53. See Acemoglu, supra note 38, at 621.
54. Id. at 621–22.
55. Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1622–23
(2014).
56. See, e.g., discussion of the “major questions doctrine,” supra note 12. R
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countability in addressing them. Similarly, questions that go to the
scope of an agency’s jurisdiction are best addressed by Congress.
The second premise that bears consideration is that the deference
puzzle described above assumes that a new administration can come
in after an election and simply rewrite all of the rules adopted by the
previous administration. Not to put too fine a point on the matter, but
this is exactly what administrative law allows.57 This power isn’t for-
mally an aspect of Chevron but derives from the same underlying
logic. The basic logic of Chevron is that statutory ambiguity delegates
to agencies a “policy space” within which they are free to operate.58
Under this logic, there is no reason for a court to say any given inter-
pretation of an ambiguous law is better or worse than another, so long
as each interpretation falls within that permissible policy space. And
so long as agency action stays within that space—including by chang-
ing an interpretation of the law—the courts say that it is up to Con-
gress, not the Judiciary, to provide course corrections. Anything else
would amount to politically unaccountable judges substituting their
policy judgments (this is, acting independently) for those of politically
accountable legislators and administrators.
In effect, the politicization of law seen in our current political mo-
ment is largely a function of deference combined with a lack of an
administrative concept of stare decisis. A virtue of stare decisis is that
it forces Congress to directly address politically undesirable opinions.
Because agencies are not bound by stare decisis, an alternative, and
politically preferable, way for Congress to remedy problematic agency
decisions is to politicize the issue. Instead of addressing the substan-
tive policy issue through legislation, individual members of Congress
can campaign on it. To take one recent example, consider the net neu-
trality Congressional Review Act (CRA) vote prior to the 2018
midterm elections,59 which was widely recognized as having very little
chance of success but was championed by its proponents as a way to
influence the 2018 elections.60 This is more directly aligned with an
individual Congresswoman’s own incentives, because, by keeping and
57. See generally F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009); Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
58. See E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of
Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2005);
Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 691 (2007).
59. Geoffrey Manne & Kristian Stout, The Net Neutrality CRA May Be the Most Tedious
Piece of Political Theater Ever, TRUTH ON MARKET (May 16, 2018), https://truthonthemarket
.com/2018/05/16/the-net-neutrality-cra-may-be-the-most-tedious-piece-of-political-theater-ever/.
60. David McCabe, Dems Hope Net Neutrality Will Be Election Issue for Young Voters, AXIOS
(Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.axios.com/dems-say-net-neutrality-will-1515515363-e2bc5236-0a49-
40ed-9089-6ad10f8b34f6.html.
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placing more members of her party in Congress, her party will be able
to control the leadership of the agency which will thus control the
shape of that agency’s policy. In other words, instead of channeling
the attention of individual Congressional actors inwards to work to-
gether to develop law and policy, that attention is channeled outwards
towards campaigning on the ills and evils of the opposing administra-
tion and party vice the virtues of their own party.
The virtue of judicial independence—of judges saying what they
think the law is or even what they think the law should be—is that it
forces a politically accountable decision. Congress can either agree or
disagree, but Congress must do something. Merely waiting for the
next administration to come along will not be sufficient to alter the
course set by the judicial interpretation of the law. Where Congress
has abdicated its responsibility to make politically accountable deci-
sions by deferring those decisions to the Executive or its agencies, the
political-accountability justification for Chevron deference fails. In
such cases, the better course for the courts may well be to enforce
Congress’s role under separation of powers by refusing deference and
returning the question to Congress.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate backstop on poor implementation of the law, by either
agencies or courts, is the political process—that is, the will of the peo-
ple as manifested generally through legislative response to that imple-
mentation. Therefore an important, and largely unexplored, question
is how the institutional design of the governmental decision-making
process—both within each branch and across the branches—attenu-
ates (or amplifies) the responsiveness of the legislative process to the
will of the people.61 Different institutional designs can either insulate
agencies and judges from or expose them to greater political account-
ability. Deference regimes have a significant effect on this process.
Greater deference to agencies’ statutory interpretations can en-
courage legislators to delegate more authority to agencies and to exer-
cise less oversight of how that authority is used. This Essay has argued
that by embracing such doctrines, the Judiciary facilitates the Legisla-
ture’s abdication of its constitutional role—and in so doing, the Judici-
ary itself arguably abdicates its own constitutional role.
61. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Kristin Firth, Separation of Powers Legitimacy: An Empirical
Inquiry into Norms About Executive Power, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1872 (2016) (noting that
“the empirical effects of structural aspects of constitutional law have so far largely escaped sys-
tematic study”).
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Whether and the extent to which this argument is accurate raises
empirical and theoretical questions that are important for understand-
ing our contemporary administrative state. It is likely the case, for in-
stance, that the concerns raised here do not apply across the board to
all applications of deference. Extending deference to major questions
that go to the bounds of an agency’s basic jurisdiction or concern great
economic or political significance is more likely to damage the separa-
tion of powers than extending deference to mundane questions about
the meaning of ambiguous statutory terms. But the lines between
those categories, and the extent to which deference extended in differ-
ent contexts may have institutionally deleterious effects, are unclear.
Regardless, we find ourselves in a moment of great concern about
both the structure of the administrative state and increased polariza-
tion and partisanship across the government. Ongoing work by both
critics and supporters of the administrative state is sharpening our un-
derstanding of these concerns. This Essay adds a new dimension to
concerns about the administrative state, relating the deference princi-
ples at the core of our contemporary administrative state to broader
concerns about the increased political polarization that has come to
characterize our government. If, as hypothesized here, deference doc-
trines do lead legislators to forego their constitutional role in favor of
a more partisan government, it is important for us to understand this
result as it relates to the operation of both Congress and the adminis-
trative state.
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